Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E, Sophocles and Joseph Almog

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23 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
19125 If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
19128 If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
19120 Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19127 The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
19124 A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh]
19126 If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
19129 The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
19130 KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
17867 If a concept is not compact, it will not be presentable to finite minds [Almog]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
17877 The number series is primitive, not the result of some set theoretic axioms [Almog]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
19121 We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
19122 Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17871 Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind [Almog]
17866 Essential definition aims at existence conditions and structural truths [Almog]
17868 Surface accounts aren't exhaustive as they always allow unintended twin cases [Almog]
17872 Definitionalists rely on snapshot-concepts, instead of on the real processes [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
17870 Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
17869 Kripke and Putnam offer an intermediary between real and nominal essences [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
17876 Individual essences are just cobbled together classificatory predicates [Almog]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
17873 Water must be related to water, just as tigers must be related to tigers [Almog]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
7811 Sophoclean heroes die terrible deaths when they oppose the new Athenian values [Sophocles, by Grayling]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
17864 Defining an essence comes no where near giving a thing's nature [Almog]
17863 Essences promise to reveal reality, but actually drive us away from it [Almog]